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BOOK REVIEW
THE LAW IN AMERICA. By Bernard Schwartz.' New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., 1974. Pp. xiii, 382. $12.50.
In a recent speech, the distinguished scholar Robert M. Hutch-
ins stated: "To understsand the law is to understand the stage of civili-
zation mankind has reached and to have some faint notion about how
it might advance to a higher stage."2 Reminiscing about the days he
spent teaching law in the late 1920's and constrasting the law then with
the law as it exists in the 1970's, Dr. Hutchins observed:
[I]n the law, as in everything else, change is the order of the day. r'm
sorry to have to tell you that it is only a slight exaggeration to say that
everything I studied in law school, and what is worse, everything I
taught there, has now been overruled or repealed. 3
If someone with Dr. Hutchins' experience, depth of perception, and in-
novative capacity were writing in 1784, when Judge Tapping Reeve es-
tablished the first American law school, or in 1870, when Christopher
Columbus Langdell, the originator of the "case method" for studying
law, became Dean of the Harvard Law School, would he have arrived at
essentially the same conclusions as Dr. Hutchins? Probably not.
Both Reeve and Langdell, and in general their contemporaries, per-
ceived law as cast in a jurisprudential model quite distinct from that
perceived by Hutchins. To Judge Reeve, law should be taught "'as a
science, and not merely nor principally as a mechanical business; nor as
a collection of loose independent fragments, but as a regular well-com-
pacted system.' "I Dean Langdell, in the preface to the first edition of
his Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, observed:
"Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doc-
trines. . . . Moreover the number of fundamental legal doctrines is
1. Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University.
2. Hutchins, All Our Institutions Are in Disarray, CENTER REPORT, Dec. 1974, at
19, 20.
3. Id.
4. A. SUTERLANrD, THE LAw AT HARvARD 28 (1967), quoting 4 T. DwiGHT, TRv-
ELS IN Nw-ENGmLAND AND NEw-YoRx 296 (1823).
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much less than is commonly supposed .... "5
In a speech delivered in 1886, Langdell further elaborated on his ap-
proach to the study of law:
"[It] was indispensable -to establish at least two things; first that law
is a science; secondly, that all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books. If law be not a science, a university will
best consult its own dignity in declining to teach it."O
"Science," as the term was used by Langdell, was not intended to denote
that the law was simply an organized body of knowledge, which was
Judge Reeve's view of "science." Rather, Langdell saw law as but one
branch of the natural sciences, analogous to chemistry or biology.7
Neither Reeve nor Langdell focused on the ephemeral nature of law,
nor did they stress cognizance of the myriad factors that molded the
then-prevailing state of the law. On the other hand, Dr. Hutchins per-
ceives law as a social, rather than a natural, science. He considers its
existing content to be shaped by diverse and compelling human con-
siderations and events. For him, law is a means to promote that which
the lawmaker seeks to attain. Law can promote good and damn evil;
it can also do the converse. When Reeve and Langdell spoke of law,
they were thinking essentially of the common law. The plethora of
legislation and agency regulations, which now play a critical role in our
legal system, were of little significance in 18th or 19th century Ameri-
can law or jurisprudential thought. Dr. Hutchins, however, must neces-
sarily include these present features of our legal system in his formula-
tions on the nature of law.
When Reeve and Langdell classified law as a science, they saw the
law as a concoction of precedents, critical analysis of judicial pro-
nouncements, adherence to the dictates of stare decisis, and logical ap-
plication of announced legal principles. The calculus of law permitted
one to determine just what was, and what was not, demanded of an indi-
vidual, enterprise, or government. One needed little prescience to pre-
dict, with reasonable accuracy, the outcome of a lawsuit once the perti-
5. A. SLUTHRLAND, supra note 4, at 174, quoting C. LANGDELL, A SELEON OF
CASES ON Tm LAw OF CoNTRACts at vi (1871).
6. A. SumTnLAND, supra note 4, at 175, quoting Address by C. Langdell, Har-
vard Law School Association, in REcoRD OF THE COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FiFm
TO EiGH, 1886, ON TnE Two HUNDRED AND FIFiErTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING
oF HARvARD COLLEGE 97 (1887).
7. See A. SrrimRLAND, supra note 4, at 175.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/6
Vol. 1974:973]
nent facts were dissected, the appropriate precedents were gathered, and
logic was exactingly applied. Assumedly, permanency and predictabili-
ty permeated the law just as they presumably marked the natural sci-
ences. As administrators of a body of rules that could be precisely ana-
lyzed, judges, like chemists or biologists, could hypothesize and
synergize in order to discern the inescapable outcome of a legal proceed-
ing. The scientist, whether judge, chemist, or biologist, would be obliged
to report and act on the conclusions his or her research and logic com-
pelled. It was what the scientist found, not what he or she aspired to,
that determined how he or she should proceed. Express judicial rejec-
tion of precedent or refusal to abide by the dictates of logic would ren-
der the judge a lawmaker, rather than a discoverer of the law, and ju-
dicial legislation was anathema in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the
20th century, with the denigration of precedent and stare decisis, the
demise of the fear of judicial legislation, the sprouting of judicial ac-
tivism, and the incessant generation of new rules of law and abandon-
ment of others by legislatures and agencies, Robert Hutchins can easily
and comfortably write that in law, as elsewhere, change is "the order
of the day."
The Law in America dispels the notion of Reeve and Langdell that
American law possesses the common indicia of a science. If one were to
enumerate the characteristics of a science, one would include the follow-
ing: (I) the presence of a highly ordered body of objectively tested prin-
ciples, which often evolve from a hypothesis later sustained by fact and
judicious extrapolation; (2) the impersonal application of pertinent
principles to the matters at hand; and (3) a high degree of predictability
of outcome in the presence of the same givens. Were law a science, each
of the mentioned characteristics would describe the formulation and ad-
ministration of the principles of our legal system. Because a semblance
of the features ascribable to a science does characterize law, Reeve and
Langdell could have reasonably arrived at their conclusions. They may
have been encouraged to do so by the fact that at that time a discipline
regarded as a science attracted singular approbation and awe. In his
forcefully presented and lucid historical study of American law, Profes-
sor Schwartz makes the case for those who do not see law as a science
but rather as a dynamic and potentially serviceable tool of social con-
trol.
Brilliantly, Professor Schwartz spins an enticing web as he develops
his thesis. At its best, law gently, but not precisely, intermeshes with the
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contemporary attitudes, values, and goals of the community it serves; it
is part and parcel of a people's thought and behavior. For the most part,
law interlaces delicately with man's foibles and achievements; it en-
hances the likelihood that a people will attain its needs, takes into ac-
count man's selfishness, nurtures man's nobility, and restrains his igno-
bility. When effective, law drains from society that which is bad and
infuses that which is good. Timeless contemporaneity, in the strictest
sense, is not the sine qua non of an ideal legal system. At times, law must
be in the forefront of change. At times, it should prudently lag behind,
serving as a critical brake on unwise, later to be popularly rejected, ad-
ventures. On occasion, law must direct a people to places they would
prefer not to go. But fundamentally, the philosophical base upon which
law is built must be linked to what is transpiring during the era
within which it is operating. Kant's concern with a priori dictates, proper
for one age, would be debilitating in another in which Holmes' pragma-
tism and insistence on judicial self-restraint, or Warren's activ-
ism and egalitarianism, or perhaps Professor Schwartz' own humanistic
jurisprudential model, would alone be suitable.
To persuade the reader of the correctness of his thesis, Professor
Schwartz has structured his presentation around soundly selected time
segments. When dealing with each segment, he focuses on chosen as-
pects of public law, private law, and those actors most closely involved
with the law: judges, lawyers, and law professors. Each category of ac-
tors is evaluated from an individual and collective perspective. A word
of caution: this work examines the grand sweep of American law rather
than the evolution of particular legal principles. If a reader wishes to
discover the intricacies of common law or equity pleading in the late
1700's or the state of the parol evidence rule in the latter 1800's, he or
she must look elsewhere. But if one is interested in exploring with a
master guide the evolution of the thought processes underlying the ap-
pearance, modification, and disappearance of the basic features of
American law, he or she will find The Law in America an enlightening
and delectable work and will be left with an insatiable urge to ponder
further Professor Schwartz' suggested philosophical criteria for this and
immediate future generations.
Professor Schwartz' format permits him cogently to present and test
his thesis. The reader is easily able to come to grips with the author's
hypotheses, to cogitate about them, and then to appraise them personally.
The author perceives four workable time periods and assigns each an
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/6
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appropriately descriptive title: (1) "The Law in the New Nation," (2)
"Formative Era," (3) "Reconstruction and Gilded Age," and (4)
"Welfare State." Because Professor Schwartz correctly sees the evolu-
tion of American law as a continuous flow rather than a matter of stop-
and-go development, he does not assign specific beginning and ending
dates for the periods. Cited dates may be helpful guideposts, but no
more. Many of the prime principles and precepts that marked the Re-
construction and Gilded Age, for instance, had their origin in the Form-
ative Era; the Welfare State did not suddenly appear on a specific
day or during a certain month in 1930, 1940, or 1950.
For analytical purposes, each of the last three legal eras are di-
vided into two sections, one entitled Public Law and the other, Private
Law and Institutions. Under Public Law, the author considers the pow-
ers of government within our constitutional framework. Under Private
Law and Institutions, he examines the general nature of the law of con-
tracts, torts, property, and enterprise as well as the conduct of judges
and lawyers. Attention is also paid to areas of special significance to
a particular period, such as the codification movement, labor law, and
the nature and impact on private law of legislative, executive, and ad-
ministrative action. The last several pages of each Private Law section
contain a discussion of what Professor Schwartz labels "Ends of Law."
Here he presents what he believes to be the overriding considerations
and tenets that determined the fundamental makeup of private law
for that time block.
If one is to appreciate fully Professor Schwartz' personal summons to
our legal system to heed what he regards as a necessary jurisprudential
model, one must note the author's perceptions of the key factors shaping
American law. It would be fair to classify Professor Schwartz as a happy,
positive-thinking philosopher. He is not a skeptic. His is not a dismal
analysis of what has transpired, nor should his candor be mistaken for
cynicism. His writing clearly conveys a basic approval of the overall
working of our legal system. Although he finds cankers, they are psori-
atic rather than malignant. He approves the curative potions that have
appeared, but would have favored their earlier arrival. His challenge to
what he discerns as a contemporary malaise is cure-directed. The author
is not engaged in a search and destroy mission but in a quest to correct
by broadening one's horizon of acceptability. While he recognizes the
danger of a failure to respond, he does not harp needlessly on the heinous
consequences that may follow rejection of his thinking-but he does
977BOOK REVIE W
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mention them.
During the first three time periods, the author perceives law as over-
whelmingly concerned with the liberty of self-assertion and property
rights. These concerns were limited, however, by a recognition of the
police power, government's inherent power to control property in the
public interest. The result was a balancing of individual self-interest and
property rights against community well-being, the point of balance vary-
ing according to the era. During the Formative Era and the Recon-
struction and Gilded Age, the former two interests weighed more heavi-
ly on the scales of justice than public health, safety, and welfare. Why
this balancing technique? Because, Professor Schwartz believes, these
were times when the urgency to facilitate economic expansion was re-
garded as of paramount importance. Law had a job to do; it had to re-
spond. But what is correct in one age may be wrong in another. By
the end of the Reconstruction and Gilded Age, individual self-assertion
and property rights, inadequately restrained, were triggering oppres-
sion and a corps of horrors. These debilitating byproducts had to be
dealt with. The law was compelled to respond. Egalitarianism for
one age may be defined in terms of equality of opportunity and the
protection of one's acquired interests. In another age, however, egali-
tarianism must assume a welfare dimension, equality of distribution.
Sadly, Professor Schwartz reports that judicial response was too slow
in coming. The law's self-confidence and almost Hegelian arrogance
were no longer realistic. But shibboleths are slow to die.
In time, the excessive stagnation dissipated. As Social Darwinism lost
its hold and as the clamor for change grew louder, the law shifted its
focus from a fixation with the freedom to behave as one wished to a
concern for the horrors and grimness which unrestrained individual lib-
erty and property rights could cause. At the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, the judiciary was weighted toward deductive reasoning, pre-
conceived notions, and reliance on precedent. Gradually, this
orientation was replaced by one of inductive reasoning, judicial digging
into the facts at hand, and appraisal of what was desirable. Professor
Schwartz notes that property rights reached their "apogee" soon after
the turn of the century. Slowly, the broad outlines of the Welfare State
began to take shape, while the importance of property rights declined. As
concern shifted away from isolated individuals and rights to relation-
ships and duties, the significance of the liberty to contract diminished.
Now the balance of individual self-assertion and property rightshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/6
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against community interest was recalibrated. Emphasis on a beneficent-
ly organized society replaced efforts to shield individual economic lib-
erties from encroachment.
Carefully, Professor Schwartz distinguishes between liberty in terms
of economics and liberty in terms of a plethora of civil rights. He speaks
of the decline of economic liberties and the ascendancy of noneconomic
liberties and is especially anxious about the protection of personal priva-
cy in a mass society.
With the abandonment of the traditional respect accorded stare decis-
is and the disappearance of the fear of judicial legislation, the law, ac-
cording to the author, has assumed a relativistic and behavioristic trait.
No longer is law the master; it is society's servant. With this shift in
outlook, certainty in the law has dissipated. The appearance of the
Welfare State has meant a renunciation of commitment to legal justice
and an espousal of social justice. Having once assumed this new na-
ture, the law has been expressly shaped in terms of the suitability of
its responses. It must be incessantly examined, evaluated, and, as re-
quired, changed. The criterion of prime importance is how well the
individual fares in fact, not whether or not bare opportunities to prosper
are present.
Professor Schwartz' own jurisprudential model is designed for what
may be regarded as a postwelfare state. It carries one beyond the eco-
nomic considerations which are usually regarded as the critical compo-
nents of a welfare state. Refusing to frame his model in bare economic
terms, the author enmeshes his standard of acceptability with humane
values and with what is considered essential for civilized life. Professor
Schwartz describes his brand of jurisprudence in the following manner:
The basic goal of the contemporary society may be taken as that of en-
suring that each individual be able to live a human life therein-that,
if all individual wants cannot be satisfied, they be satisfied at least inso-
far as is reasonably possible and to the extent of a human minimum.
The interests the law vindicates must find their ultimate justification in
the realization of this goal.8
He insists that when all interests are placed on the scales of justice, the
balance must be struck in favor of "the ultimate social interest," which,
he finds, "is that in the individual life."D Law is good when it proceeds to
8. B. SCHWARTZ, TuE LA w IN AMEICA 286 (1974) (footnote omitted).
9. Id. at 287.
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satisfy human wants, bad when it fails to do so. He sees "[tjhe task of the
law. .. as that of adjusting or harmonizing conflicting human wants
or expectations so as to achieve the values of civilization with a minimum
of friction and waste."' 0 Patently, postwelfare state jurisprudence is to
be predicated on cooperation and interdependence rather than competi-
tion and the protection of an individual's acquired interests. According
to the author, society may compel the law to move away from a regula-
tory role to a distributive one. "[F]inancial burdens incident to life
will increasingly be borne by the society and . . . the individual will
be assured at least the minimum requirements of a standard human
life."" If our court system fails to adopt this humanistic jurisprudence,
Professor Schwartz warns that the system may be bypassed in favor of
an institutional framework that does.
How sound is Professor Schwartz' jurisprudential model at a time
when the nation, and much of the world, is undergoing a vast and shock-
ing economic dislocation? Although unvoiced, the author's underlying
assumption appears to be that there is an escalating level of human
wants and that such level should be met. Concededly, he does speak of
distribution, and this could simply mean redistribution of whatever is
available, be it much or be it little. Yet, his model does seem to be most
appropriate for an affluent society. As one discerns what appears to be,
at best, a short period of economic distress or, at worst, a long period of
grave economic disturbance, one wonders if Professor Schwartz would
qualify some aspects of his model if he were writing at this moment.
Would he add the variable of individual contribution to society in time
of shortages? Is humanistic jurisprudence, unrestricted by limiting fac-
tors, consistent with a society which is obliged to combat the rigors in-
herent in a retreat from affluence? Should there not be a contributive
factor linked to the distributive element? Is it necessarily in the best
interests of a post-affluent, or momentarily nonaffluent, society to pay
close heed to distributing that which is available rather than generating
more to distribute? It is still too early, though, to make any meaningful
suggestion as to how, if at all, the current state of national and world
affairs will affect Professor Schartz' model.
Professor Schwartz has indeed prepared a book worthy of close scru-
tiny by anyone interested in understanding the history of American law
10. Id. at 308 (footnote omitted).
11. Id.
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and in appreciating the numerous difficulties now confronting our legal
system. With deliberateness, the author makes his case: unless correc-
tive action is forthcoming, the legitimacy of our judicial process may be
successfully challenged, and our courts will be bypassed in favor of other
institutions. Many of Professor Schwartz' valuable insights and propos-
als have been left unmentioned here, but they are certain to attract and
retain the intense interest of whoever sets aside several hours to read this
important contribution to American jurisprudential history by an au-
thor who has already made his mark as a legal scholar.
EDWIN W. TUCK.R*
* Professor of Business Law, University of Connecticut.
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